This took time.
The British also had to study Jacksonās position.
They needed to decide whether it could be broken.
Several actions before January 8 tested that question.
The campaign was not one battle.
It was a sequence.
There was the fight on Lake Borgne.
There was the landing.
There was the December 23 night battle.
There were later probes.
There was an artillery duel.
Only then came the mass assault remembered as the Battle of New Orleans.
The U.S. Army Center of Military History treats the Gulf campaign in exactly this wider way, placing the January 8 assault inside a chain of operations rather than presenting it as an isolated morning.
That wider view also makes the Choctaw role easier to see.
They were present during the waiting, scouting, and skirmishing between the large clashes.
Their work existed in the spaces between the famous dates.
December 24: A Peace Treaty an Ocean Away
One of historyās strangest details occurred the day after Jacksonās night attack.
On December 24, 1814, American and British representatives in Ghent signed a peace agreement.
The Treaty of Ghent was meant to end the War of 1812.
But the armies outside New Orleans did not know it.
Even more important, signing alone did not instantly end the war.
The treaty had to be ratified.
Article I stated that āAll hostilities both by sea and land shall ceaseā once the treaty had been ratified by both parties. The original treaty is preserved by the National Archives in Record Group 11, Perfected Treaties, 1778ā1945.
This corrects one of the most repeated myths about New Orleans.
The battle was not simply a pointless fight held after the war was already legally over.
The treaty had been signed.
But it had not yet completed the ratification process required by its own terms.
The National Park Service notes that the war did not officially end merely because negotiators signed the document on December 24.
Outside New Orleans, none of this changed the immediate reality.
British soldiers still faced Jackson.
Jackson still expected another attack.
The Choctaws still watched the swamp.
The American Line
Jacksonās defensive position became stronger each day.
The Rodriguez Canal helped.
So did mud.
So did earth.
So did cotton-country labor.
Soldiers and civilians improved the position.
Artillery was placed where it could sweep the open ground.
The Mississippi protected one end.
The swamp complicated the other.
The American line was not an enormous stone fortress.
It did not need to be.
It only needed to force the British to attack across open ground while American troops fired from prepared positions.
That advantage grew stronger as time passed.
Every delay after December 23 helped Jackson.
This is why the small actions between the armies mattered.
The British needed freedom to observe and prepare.
Jackson wanted to deny them that freedom.
Choctaw skirmishers near the swamp were part of that denial.
They could not stop British engineers from working everywhere.
They could not prevent the British from bringing up artillery.
But they could make the left side of the battlefield uncomfortable and dangerous.
December 28
The British tested the American position again on December 28.
The attack was more organized than the night fight five days earlier.
British troops moved toward Jacksonās defenses.
The Americans did not abandon the line.
British commanders gained a clearer view of what stood in front of them.
They also learned that the American position would not be easy to break.
The battlefield itself was becoming an American weapon.
Plantation fields gave attackers open ground.
Jacksonās line gave defenders cover.
The swamp restricted one flank.
The river restricted the other.
Artillery could fire into the approaches.
The British still had choices.
But none were simple.
One possibility involved crossing the Mississippi and attacking American guns on the west bank.
Another was a direct assault on Jacksonās main line.
Both ideas would become part of the final British plan.
January 1, 1815
On New Yearās Day, artillery dominated the field.
British guns opened a heavy bombardment against the American position.
Jacksonās artillery answered.
For hours, smoke and cannon fire covered the plantation ground.
The British hoped to damage American guns and weaken the defenses enough to make a later attack possible.
The Americans held.
The artillery duel revealed another problem for the British.
Moving heavy guns through Louisiana mud was difficult.
Keeping them supplied with ammunition was difficult.
Protecting them was difficult.
American artillery positions were already established.
The British had to bring much of their equipment forward through the same long supply chain that had carried the army from the fleet.
The January 1 action did not destroy Jacksonās line.
The final assault was delayed again.
More time passed.
For the men on the battlefield, that meant more nights in wet camps.
More patrols.
More picket duty.
More watching.
More small clashes.
And more opportunities for fighters near the swamp to harass exposed troops.
Why the Numbers Keep Changing
Historical accounts give different numbers for the Choctaw presence around New Orleans.
That can be confusing.
One source says 18.
Another says around 30.
Another gives 50 or 60.
A broader account of the campaign may mention hundreds of Choctaws.
The numbers only make sense when tied to a time and place.
The 795 figure concerns Choctaws who answered Jacksonās call and reported for the wider campaign.
The 30 to 60 estimate concerns Juzanās smaller force that went toward New Orleans.
The 18 figure concerns those specifically identified with Juzan during Jacksonās December 23 counterattack.