The question led investigators back toward Fort Meade.
And toward a name I had been trying very hard not to think about.
Evan Rourke.
Evan Rourke had been one of the first people to congratulate me when I became Deputy Director.
He sent flowers to my office.
Not expensive ones.
A simple arrangement with a handwritten note.
You've earned the chair. Now make them listen.
I kept that note for years.
Evan understood how difficult the transition had been.
Some people believed I was too analytical.
Others said I was too direct.
A few questioned whether someone who had spent so much of her career challenging established assumptions could become an effective senior leader.
Evan seemed to appreciate precisely those qualities.
He helped coordinate my early meetings.
Explained complicated internal processes.
And warned me when a seemingly minor administrative issue was likely to create larger problems.
I trusted him.
Not blindly.
But more than I trusted most people.
That made the evidence pointing toward his office difficult to accept.
The independent review showed that the suspicious communications updates had passed through his coordination team.
Records also established that an authorized request for my emergency travel information had been handled irregularly.
The information didn't simply go to the protective liaison responsible for my safety.
It appeared to have reached an outside contact without a valid operational need.
Investigators began examining who accessed the information and what communications followed.
Evan insisted the problem was administrative.
He said emergency coordination involved many people.
That details could be forwarded incorrectly.
And that the timing was unfortunate.
When interviewed, he described his relationship with Meridian Signalworks as routine.
The company supported projects involving government communications.
He knew Caleb Voss through professional meetings.
Nothing unusual about that.
For several days, investigators had reason to examine his account but not enough to conclude he had deliberately assisted the attempt to delay me.
Then a Meridian compliance officer contacted the company's independent legal review team.
Her name was Nadia Chen.
She was thirty-four, a former systems assurance specialist who had recently moved into internal compliance.
Nadia had spent seven years at Meridian.
She understood the technology well enough to recognize when technical claims were being used as business arguments.
And she had become uncomfortable with several documents circulated during the weeks before the communications incident.