The second wave was part of a larger seventeen-bomber strike.
None of these complications makes the story weaker.
They make it more historically useful.
The simplified version celebrates courage.
The full version explains why courage succeeded.
The actual physical destruction may have been lower than the official score
Current Naval History and Heritage Command analysis notes that postwar Japanese records indicate three aircraft from the second formation were actually seen falling in flames as a direct result of O’Hare’s attack, although he damaged other bombers significantly and official wartime credit remained five destroyed. (Lịch Sử Hải Quân)
Other Navy sources reconstruct the losses slightly differently.
This disagreement itself is evidence of how difficult exact air-combat accounting can be.
An aircraft O’Hare damaged might later be finished by another attacker.
A bomber attacked by several Americans might be credited differently in separate records.
Some aircraft that looked destroyed could recover.
Others could crash beyond visual range.
A responsible history therefore keeps two layers visible:
Official 1942 credit: five destroyed, one badly damaged.
Postwar reconstruction: fewer direct confirmed kills, with additional aircraft damaged and the overall Japanese formation devastated by the combined American defense.
O’Hare’s Medal of Honor does not depend on pretending these layers are identical.
The Japanese commander’s aircraft illustrates the confusion
The bomber associated with Lieutenant Commander Takuzo Ito was hit during O’Hare’s later passes.
It lost an engine and fell out of normal formation.
Accounts indicate that its crew tried to continue aggressively rather than simply abandon the attack. (Pacific Wrecks)
From an American cockpit, such an aircraft might be counted as destroyed immediately.
From Japanese records, its exact final sequence could later be traced differently.
This difference between what is visible during combat and what can be reconstructed decades later is why historical revisions should not be treated as accusations against pilots.
O’Hare reported what he believed had happened.
Sherman adjusted the claims.
The Navy awarded credit.
Historians later gained additional evidence.
Each stage represents a different information environment.
One bullet hole also tells us something about attack geometry
O’Hare repeatedly entered defensive gun range.
Yet his Wildcat returned with remarkably little enemy damage.
Luck certainly mattered.
No tactical method can guarantee immunity from several bomber gunners.
But his positioning probably reduced exposure.
A fighter sitting directly behind the formation for thirty seconds presents gunners with repeated opportunities.
A fighter crossing quickly through the firing envelope presents a rapidly changing angular problem.
If it disappears below or past the formation after only a short burst, the gunner must reacquire it.
Then it may return from another side.
O’Hare’s survival is therefore consistent with the logic of his attack.
The technique did not eliminate risk.
It prevented the enemy from receiving an easy continuous shot.
The Wildcat’s ruggedness provided another layer of confidence
American pilots came to appreciate Grumman fighters for structural toughness.
The F4F could absorb damage that might destroy lighter aircraft.
This characteristic mattered psychologically.
A pilot willing to make close passes needs confidence that one hit will not automatically disintegrate the aircraft.
But ruggedness should not be romanticized.
A 20 mm cannon shell in the cockpit could still kill O’Hare instantly.
A hit in a critical engine component could stop the fighter.
A severed control cable could make maneuvering impossible.
The Wildcat gave him margin.
It did not give him invulnerability.
O’Hare’s training allowed him to exploit a small window before the carrier’s guns opened
A carrier fighter intercept works best when conducted at distance.
The closer the enemy gets to the fleet, the more complicated friendly fire becomes.
O’Hare had only a narrow region in which he could attack freely before Lexington’s gunners joined.
This gave each firing pass a time limit.
He could not climb lazily and set up perfect textbook attacks.
He needed to convert altitude into fast passes.
The bomber formation itself was closing perhaps several miles every minute.
Every turn O’Hare made consumed distance.
This is why six minutes were enough to determine the engagement.
A fighter combat lasting half an hour would have been meaningless.
The bombers would reach the carrier long before then.
The problem was therefore mathematical as well as physical
Suppose the formation is nine miles from the carrier.
Suppose it is moving at roughly two hundred miles per hour.
Ignoring evasive changes, that distance disappears in only a few minutes.
O’Hare needs time to attack.
A complete firing pass requires:
approach,
aim,
burst,
separation,
turn,
climb or reposition,
and another approach.
Only a limited number of cycles fit inside the remaining distance.
The ammunition supply imposes another limit.
Defensive fire imposes another.
Carrier antiaircraft fire imposes another.
The engagement is a constrained optimization problem conducted at hundreds of miles per hour.
O’Hare could not maximize everything.
He chose to maximize useful firing opportunities.
That is why positioning above and offset from the formation mattered before the first shot.
A less skilled pilot might have made only one effective pass
The first approach is usually the easiest because the fighter begins with prepared altitude and relative position.
After the pass, everything becomes harder.
The pilot may be below the bombers.
Energy may be reduced.
The formation may change direction.
Gunners are fully alert.
Distance to the carrier is shorter.
A good fighter pilot must not merely execute one attack.
He must preserve enough energy and position to create the second.
O’Hare created several.
This ability to chain attacks together is what turned one Wildcat into a serious formation-level threat.
He was making decisions faster than the public story later suggested
News accounts could describe:
first bomber,
second bomber,
third bomber,
and so on.
O’Hare did not experience the engagement as a leisurely sequence.
He saw relative positions changing continuously.
A bomber damaged on the first pass might rejoin while he attacked another.
A burning aircraft might cross his path.
Tracer could force an adjustment.
The carrier itself was moving below.
Another fighter or shipboard shell might enter the same space.
He could not stop after each pass to confirm results.
The historical narrative is linear.
The actual combat was simultaneous.
That difference explains why reconstructed kill counts are so difficult.
The Japanese formation had its own time pressure
O’Hare was not the only person racing against the clock.
The Japanese crews had flown hundreds of miles from Rabaul.
They had expended fuel.
They needed to locate the task force, organize the approach, survive fighters, release bombs, and still possess enough fuel to return.
Every diversion increased fuel consumption.
Every damaged engine increased drag.
Every forced maneuver reduced formation efficiency.
O’Hare’s attacks therefore imposed costs even when bullets did not produce immediate kills.
A bomber with an engine damaged might still reach the carrier but fail to return to Rabaul.
A bomber forced away might survive physically but fail its mission.
Combat effectiveness and aircraft survival were intertwined.
Only two Bettys reportedly returned from the seventeen-plane effort
The scale of Japanese losses demonstrates the danger of the mission.
The first formation suffered heavily.
The second suffered heavily.
The long return to Rabaul finished aircraft already damaged in combat.
Modern Navy analysis concludes that only two of the seventeen G4Ms returned, both damaged. (Lịch Sử Hải Quân)
For the 4th Air Group, this was an enormous loss of aircraft and, more importantly, trained crews.
Japan could build more aircraft.
Replacing experienced naval aviators was much harder.
This problem would become increasingly severe as the Pacific War continued.
The United States eventually created an enormous pilot-training pipeline.
Japan struggled to replace veteran aircrew at the same rate.
The February 20 battle was too early to decide that long-term contest, but it foreshadowed it.
O’Hare’s individual action fit a larger American preference for aimed fire
American fighter doctrine placed substantial emphasis on aerial gunnery.
Thach’s squadron practiced it aggressively.
O’Hare excelled.
This emphasis complemented the .50-caliber Browning.
The weapon offered high velocity, substantial destructive power, and reliable performance when properly maintained.
Four guns firing together could concentrate a devastating stream into a bomber engine or wing.
But the system only worked if rounds hit.
A pilot who sprayed at long range simply converted precious ammunition into empty cartridge cases.
O’Hare’s reputation as a marksman mattered more than the raw number of guns.
His firing discipline would have been visible in the ammunition afterward
When a fighter landed, armorers could examine ammunition expenditure.
Pilots could report gun problems.
Mechanics could inspect barrels and feed systems.
Combat results were therefore connected to maintenance.
O’Hare’s empty guns showed that he had used almost everything available.
The fact that the ammunition lasted through several passes showed that he had not simply held the trigger during the first dive.
This balance is one reason the award citation specifically praised how he used limited ammunition. (Lịch Sử Hải Quân)
Official language usually becomes memorable for courage.
Here it also preserved a technical fact.
Dufilho’s malfunction emphasized the importance of ordnance reliability
Four working guns gave O’Hare thirty-four seconds.
Four jammed guns gave Dufilho no effective firing time.
This gap explains why carrier air groups depended on hundreds of maintainers and armorers whose names rarely enter combat narratives.
A fighter pilot could be perfect.
If the guns did not function, his offensive role disappeared.
The men loading ammunition belts, inspecting feed chutes, cleaning guns, and maintaining electrical systems were part of every victory.