It showed that Keller had repeatedly directed employees to discourage certain categories of applicants and had pressured them to report unsuccessful intake encounters in ways that improved branch performance statistics.
He had been warned about the resulting complaints.
He had dismissed those concerns.
And he had continued the practices.
The problem wasn't one bad morning.
The morning had exposed a pattern.
When Keller received the summary of findings, he stared at the document.
For years, he believed his performance awards proved he was doing an excellent job.
Now the same numbers that earned him praise were being examined as evidence of a system that misrepresented how customers were treated.
He looked toward the framed awards on his office wall.
For a moment, he felt angry.
Then ashamed.
But the feeling that frightened him most was something he hadn't expected.
He could no longer tell himself that everyone else had misunderstood what he was trying to do.
The records showed exactly what he'd instructed.
And he would have to answer for it.
The board's decisions came over the following two weeks.
They were not announced in a dramatic ten-minute meeting.
The independent review had taken time because the bank owed its customers, employees, and shareholders something more reliable than anger.
Martin Keller's employment was terminated after the applicable process. The decision reflected sustained findings involving his treatment of customers, repeated disregard of approved account-opening procedures, and his role in directing inaccurate application classifications.
Cynthia Price was also dismissed after investigators determined that she knowingly participated in improper record changes and failed to preserve the accuracy of customer intake information.
Patrick Dunn, the senior teller who had helped train employees to use misleading withdrawal categories, faced a separate disciplinary review. The bank found that he had participated in the practice despite receiving instructions that conflicted with the approved account process, and his employment was terminated after the review was completed.
Several other employees received corrective action or retraining for procedural failures.
But the investigators did not treat every employee who worked in the branch as equally responsible.
Some had followed unclear instructions without knowing the underlying practices were improper.
Others had objected.
And a few had attempted to report concerns through channels that failed to protect them.
The bank evaluated those circumstances separately.
Sofia Morales retained her job.
Her workstation-security failures were addressed, but she was not punished as though she had designed the policies she questioned.