On January 11, 1944, the air war over Germany produced one of the strangest fighter actions of the American daylight bombing campaign. A single P-51B Mustang remained beside a formation of B-17 Flying Fortresses while more than thirty German fighters tried to break through to the bombers. The American pilot did not have a wingman covering his blind side. He did not have another flight of Mustangs waiting above him. He did not even have a full set of working guns by the end of the fight. Three of his four .50-caliber machine guns eventually stopped firing, his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and his fuel supply was becoming dangerous. Still, Major James H. Howard continued turning back toward the German fighters.
The engagement lasted about thirty minutes. That does not sound long until the geometry of air combat is considered. A fighter closing at hundreds of miles per hour can cross several miles in less than a minute. A firing opportunity may last only seconds. A pilot can complete several violent climbs, dives, turns, and attacks in the time it takes someone on the ground to walk across a room. Thirty minutes of repeated combat at altitude meant dozens of decisions involving speed, position, fuel, ammunition, identification, and the location of the bombers Howard was trying to protect.
The most important part of the story was not that Howard found himself alone. Fighter pilots became separated from their units regularly in the confusion of combat. What made the incident exceptional was what he did after he realized it. He had a choice. He could search for his squadron, regain mutual protection, and then return to the bombers. That would have been the safer and doctrinally sensible action. Instead, he looked back at the formation of B-17s and saw German fighters attacking without another American escort immediately available. He decided that the bombers could not wait for him to rebuild his formation.
So he went back alone.
That decision was especially remarkable because Howard was not an inexperienced pilot reacting impulsively to his first battle. He understood exactly what flying alone could cost. He had already fought in China with the American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers. He had flown carrier fighters for the U.S. Navy before that. He had taught younger pilots not to wander alone in enemy airspace because German fighters hunting in formations could destroy an isolated Mustang. On January 11, he broke his own normal rule because the situation around the bombers demanded it.
The result became the action for which Howard received the Medal of Honor. His official citation states that he attacked a formation of more than thirty German aircraft single-handed for roughly thirty minutes. During that period he destroyed three enemy aircraft, probably destroyed and damaged others, and continued even after three guns went out of action and his fuel supply became dangerously low. He had already destroyed a Bf 110 earlier in the engagement before losing contact with his group, bringing the commonly credited total for the day to four destroyed aircraft.
The medal citation compresses the event into a few paragraphs. The actual story began much earlier, with a strategic problem the United States had still not solved completely at the beginning of 1944: how to protect heavy bombers deep inside Germany.
THE BOMBERS COULD REACH GERMANY BEFORE THEIR ESCORTS COULD
The American daylight bombing campaign had been built around the idea that heavily armed bomber formations could strike industrial targets with precision while defending themselves with massed machine-gun fire. The B-17 Flying Fortress carried numerous .50-caliber guns, and a tight combat box allowed the guns of several bombers to overlap. In theory, a German fighter attacking one bomber would expose itself to fire from several others.
In practice, concentrated Luftwaffe fighter attacks proved that defensive guns alone were not enough. German pilots learned to attack from directions where the B-17s were most vulnerable, and they increasingly coordinated large formations instead of relying only on isolated passes. Twin-engine fighters could stand off and fire rockets. Heavily armed interceptors could attack from the front. Single-engine fighters could strike damaged bombers that fell out of formation. When American escorts had to turn home because of fuel limitations, the German fighters waited for exactly that moment.
The terrible losses of 1943 demonstrated the problem. Deep missions to places such as Schweinfurt showed that unescorted or partially escorted bomber formations could suffer losses that were impossible to sustain indefinitely. The United States could build more B-17s and B-24s, but bombers also contained ten trained men. Losing sixty aircraft in a single mission meant losing far more than aluminum. It meant killed, wounded, captured, and missing crews whose training had taken months.
The solution had to be long-range fighter escort.
The P-47 Thunderbolt and P-38 Lightning provided useful escort over parts of the route, but their practical combat radius limited how long they could remain with the bombers over the deepest targets. Drop tanks improved the problem, but the bomber force still entered periods when German fighters could attack after the escorts turned away. What Eighth Air Force needed was a fighter capable of accompanying the bombers to targets deep inside Germany and staying with them long enough to contest the Luftwaffe where German defenses were strongest.
The P-51B Mustang began changing that equation in late 1943. Powered by the Packard-built Merlin engine and able to carry external fuel tanks, the Mustang combined range with the performance required to fight Bf 109s and Fw 190s at altitude. The 354th Fighter Group became the first American unit in Europe to take the P-51B/C into combat. Although assigned to Ninth Air Force, the group operated under VIII Fighter Command for long-range bomber escort.
Howard was one of the most experienced combat pilots in the group.
HOWARD HAD ALREADY FOUGHT ONE AIR WAR
James Howell Howard had been born in Canton, China, in 1913. His father was a physician working in China, and Howard spent much of his childhood there before returning to the United States. He graduated from Pomona College and entered naval aviation, eventually flying fighters from USS Enterprise before the United States entered World War II.
Then he made an unusual decision. He left active Navy service and joined Claire Chennault's American Volunteer Group in China. The AVG, better known as the Flying Tigers, was composed largely of American pilots who flew Curtiss P-40 fighters in support of China against Japan before the group was absorbed into the U.S. military structure.
Howard's experience there mattered enormously later. Chennault's tactics emphasized using the strengths of the P-40 instead of trying to fight Japanese aircraft in the manner the Japanese preferred. The P-40 could dive well and was rugged, but it could not match the turning performance of some Japanese fighters. Chennault taught pilots to use speed, altitude, diving attacks, teamwork, and disciplined gunnery. A pilot who forgot those rules and entered a slow turning fight might not survive long enough to learn from the mistake.
Howard became an ace in China, credited by the Air Force Historical Support Division with six Japanese fighters destroyed and a share in the destruction of a bomber. He also rose into leadership positions in the AVG. He had therefore already experienced the confusion of real aerial combat, the difficulty of confirming victories, the importance of fuel and ammunition, and the danger of becoming isolated.
When he returned to American service, he entered the Army Air Forces and eventually became commander of the 356th Fighter Squadron in the 354th Fighter Group. By the time the group went to England, he was not simply another new pilot learning the Mustang. He was a combat veteran surrounded largely by men who had not yet accumulated equivalent experience.
That background explains why his action on January 11 cannot be dismissed as an inexperienced pilot failing to understand the danger of being alone. Howard knew the danger. He had taught it. He chose the danger because he believed the bombers needed immediate help more than he needed the protection of his squadron.
THE P-51 CHANGED WHAT ESCORT COULD MEAN
The Mustang Howard flew that day was not the later bubble-canopy P-51D that became the most familiar image of the type. The 354th was equipped with P-51B aircraft. These early Merlin-powered Mustangs carried four .50-caliber machine guns rather than the six guns of the later P-51D. Their cockpit visibility was more restricted, and the gun installation could suffer ammunition-feed problems under hard maneuvering. That detail would become critical in Howard's fight. The later P-51D increased armament to six .50-caliber guns and incorporated a simplified feed arrangement that substantially reduced gun jams.
What the P-51B offered was range. With external tanks, the Mustang could reach farther into Germany than earlier fighter escorts while retaining excellent high-altitude performance. For bomber crews accustomed to watching friendly fighters turn away while German interceptors gathered ahead, the appearance of Mustangs near the target changed the psychological balance.
Fighter pilots called the heavy bombers their “big friends.” Bomber crews called the escort fighters “little friends.” The relationship was practical rather than sentimental. Bombers provided enormous offensive striking power but were vulnerable to concentrated fighter attack. Fighters could destroy or disrupt enemy interceptors but carried little strategic bomb load. Together, they formed a system.
The system still depended on timing. Escorts did not simply remain beside one bomber group from takeoff in England until landing. Different fighter units met the bomber stream at different points. One group might cover the outbound route. Another would arrive around the target. Fresh fighters could pick up the formations on the return journey. If weather, navigation, fuel use, or timing disrupted one link, a gap could appear.
January 11 produced exactly that kind of danger.
THE MISSION WAS LARGE, DEEP, AND ALREADY GOING WRONG
Eighth Air Force planned a major strike against aircraft-industry targets in central Germany. The force included hundreds of B-17s and B-24s aimed at areas including Oschersleben and Halberstadt, where German aircraft production made the targets especially valuable. Air & Space Forces Magazine records 525 B-17s and 138 B-24s dispatched toward the aviation targets, with sixty heavy bombers failing to return from the day's operations.
The weather over England was poor. Heavy cloud complicated assembly, navigation, and escort coordination. A recall order was transmitted as conditions deteriorated, but not every formation received or acted on the order in the same way. The First Bombardment Division continued toward the target area.
That decision carried the bombers into one of the hardest Luftwaffe defensive efforts since the great Schweinfurt battles of 1943.
The German fighter force defending central Germany remained dangerous. Bf 109s and Fw 190s provided the core of single-engine interception units. Twin-engine Bf 110s and Ju 88s could bring heavier firepower. Some twin-engine aircraft had originally been designed for other roles, but in the defensive battle over Germany they could attack bomber formations with cannon, machine guns, and in some cases rockets.
The Luftwaffe also adapted to American escort tactics. Drop tanks allowed German fighters greater endurance. Fighter controllers could concentrate interceptors along the bomber route. Instead of appearing as a few isolated aircraft, dozens could arrive around a vulnerable segment of the bomber stream.
The American bombing campaign itself created predictability. Large bomber formations could not turn instantly or hide. They flew toward known industrial areas at high altitude. Radar, observers, and fighter-control networks gave German defenders time to move aircraft into position. The bombers possessed enormous firepower, but they also created an obvious target in the sky.
Howard's 354th Fighter Group launched forty-nine Mustangs for the escort mission. The plan called for the P-51s to meet the bombers in the target area. Howard was serving as combat leader. That meant his responsibilities extended beyond protecting his own aircraft. He had to direct other squadrons and flights toward the parts of the bomber stream under the greatest pressure.
As the Mustangs approached the rendezvous, German radar interference and radio noise reminded the pilots that the Luftwaffe knew they were coming. Howard sent small elements toward German fighters encountered along the route but kept the main body moving toward the bombers. Destroying one fighter away from the bomber stream meant little if dozens were already attacking the Fortresses.
When Howard finally saw the bomber force, the scale of the German attack was obvious.
THE SKY AROUND THE BOMBERS WAS ALREADY FULL OF FIGHTERS
Howard later remembered that the bomber stream was under intense attack by dozens of enemy aircraft. Eighth Air Force estimates for the wider battle reached roughly five hundred German fighters involved across the mission. The exact number visible to Howard at any single moment cannot be known, but this was not a small interception.
He responded as a group leader should. He distributed strength. Other squadron commanders were sent toward the middle and rear portions of the bomber stream. Howard moved toward the leading formation.
This was already a difficult command decision. Fighter leaders naturally wanted to remain together because concentration provided mutual support. Yet the bombers stretched across miles of sky. If all the Mustangs remained clustered around one portion of the stream, German fighters could devastate another. Escort required deliberate dispersion.
Howard climbed toward attackers threatening the lead bombers. A twin-engine Bf 110 appeared ahead of him, moving toward the Fortresses.
He closed.
Howard later recalled waiting until the German aircraft filled his gunsight before firing a burst of several seconds. The Bf 110 began smoking and went down. According to the later account, its wings eventually broke away.
The engagement immediately became more confused. Howard attacked another fighter and then pursued an Fw 190. By the time that sequence ended, his wingman and the rest of his immediate formation were no longer beside him.