The morning's defensive picture became increasingly complicated.
Then Torpedo Squadron Three From Yorktown Arrived
VT-3 had some fighter support from F4F Wildcats, unlike the complete isolation experienced by VT-8.
But the escort was inadequate against the number and tactical advantages of the Japanese Zeros.
The Wildcats themselves became heavily engaged.
The Devastators still had to descend toward the carriers.
Twelve TBDs attacked.
Most were destroyed.
Again, the torpedoes failed to score the kind of hit that could justify the losses tactically.
By the end of the sequence, American torpedo squadrons had suffered catastrophic casualties.
Across the carrier-based Devastator attacks, dozens of aircraft had been lost.
Not one Japanese carrier had been crippled by an American aerial torpedo that morning.
On paper, the result looked like complete failure.
If the Battle of Midway had ended at that moment, the torpedo attacks would likely be remembered primarily as disastrous evidence of obsolete aircraft, defective weapons, and poor coordination.
The battle did not end.
The Japanese Combat Air Patrol Had Been Fighting Almost Continuously
This is where the historical interpretation becomes more complicated.
A popular version of Midway says the torpedo squadrons deliberately dragged the Japanese Zero fighters down to sea level, sacrificing themselves so American dive bombers could attack the carriers from above.
That version is emotionally powerful.
It is also too simple.
The torpedo crews were not sent in as sacrificial bait.
They intended to hit the carriers.
They did not know exactly when the dive bombers would arrive.
American strike coordination had broken down badly.
The different squadrons were reaching the Japanese force independently rather than executing one carefully synchronized plan.
The Japanese combat air patrol did not consist of every fighter sitting at sea level in one neat group when the dive bombers arrived.
Zeros operated at different altitudes and were continually being directed toward threats.
But repeated low-level torpedo attacks did matter.
Japanese fighters had to engage them.
Pilots descended.
They expended ammunition.
They moved away from other sectors.
Carrier crews and fighter directors had to keep reacting.
The fleet maneuvered repeatedly.
Defensive attention became heavily focused on low-altitude attackers.
The torpedo attacks were therefore one important part of the tactical disorder that existed when the dive bombers arrived.
They were not the entire explanation.
History rarely offers such clean chains.
Another American Decision Far Away From the Torpedo Bombers Was Becoming Equally Important
Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky was leading dive bombers from USS Enterprise.
They had flown toward the expected Japanese position and found empty ocean.
Fuel was becoming a problem.
Turning back would preserve the aircraft.
Continuing the search risked losing planes over the Pacific.
McClusky continued.
Then he saw something below.
A Japanese destroyer moving quickly.
The destroyer was Arashi.
It had been delayed while attacking the American submarine USS Nautilus.
Now it was racing to rejoin the carrier force.
A destroyer steaming at high speed in a particular direction can become an arrow.
McClusky treated it that way.
He followed the course.
Ahead lay the Japanese carriers.
This decision would become one of the most consequential moments of the battle.
The dive bombers had found the fleet.
At Nearly the Same Time, Yorktown's Dive Bombers Were Approaching From Another Direction
Lieutenant Commander Maxwell Leslie led dive bombers from Yorktown.
Their arrival was not part of one perfectly synchronized master plan with McClusky.
Circumstance, search decisions, and timing brought the groups toward the Japanese carriers at almost the same moment.
This is what makes Midway so remarkable.
American coordination had often been poor.
Torpedo attacks had been destroyed.
Fighter escorts had become separated.
Some aircraft had flown useless courses.
Fuel was running low.
Yet through a combination of intelligence, initiative, persistence, and timing, the dive bombers appeared over the Japanese force during a brief window when the carriers were exceptionally vulnerable.
Below them, Japanese attention had been consumed by repeated attacks.
The fleet was still recovering from the latest torpedo strike.
The combat air patrol was not positioned to stop every high-altitude threat.
And the American dive bombers were above.
Exactly where the Devastators had been unable to go.
A Dive Bomber Attacked in Almost the Opposite Way From a Torpedo Bomber
The SBD Dauntless approached from altitude.
Once over the target, the pilot pushed the aircraft into a steep dive.
The carrier rapidly filled the windscreen.
The dive allowed greater bombing accuracy than ordinary high-level bombing.
The aircraft also moved rapidly through altitude, making interception difficult once the attack had begun.
The pilot released the bomb and pulled out low.
It was dangerous.
But tactically, the dive bomber possessed advantages the TBD did not.
It did not need to fly several miles straight and level just above the water toward a carrier while fighters lined up behind it.
The SBD could convert altitude into attack energy.
The Japanese combat air patrol needed to intercept the aircraft before the dives began.
On the morning of June 4, enough dive bombers reached attack position.
Then they came down.
The Japanese Flight Decks Were Busy, but the Famous “Five Minutes From Launch” Story Requires Caution
For decades, popular retellings described the Japanese carriers as being covered with fully armed strike aircraft ready to launch at the exact moment American dive bombers appeared.
The image was unforgettable.
Aircraft packed wingtip to wingtip.
Fuel lines across the deck.
Bombs and torpedoes everywhere.
The Americans arriving literally seconds before a Japanese counterstrike launched.
More detailed later study has complicated that picture.
Japanese carrier operations were in constant motion that morning.
Aircraft were being recovered, serviced, fueled, armed, moved between hangars and flight decks, and prepared according to changing orders.
Nagumo had faced a difficult sequence of decisions about whether to launch another strike on Midway or prepare weapons against American ships after reports of the U.S. fleet arrived.
The carriers were certainly vulnerable.
Fuel, ordnance, aircraft handling, and the normal hazards of carrier operations increased the danger once bombs began exploding.
But it is misleading to imagine that one perfectly prepared Japanese strike was literally five minutes from taking off in a single mass.
The true situation was messy.
That mess made the American attack no less decisive.
Perhaps it makes it more understandable.
The Japanese carrier system had been under continuous pressure all morning.
Now bombs began falling into that system.
Kaga Was Hit Hard
American Dauntlesses dived.
Bombs struck Kaga.
Explosions and fires spread through the carrier.
Aircraft, fuel, and ordnance contributed to the destruction.
Damage-control crews faced an increasingly impossible situation.
A carrier is especially vulnerable to internal fire.
Its purpose requires aviation gasoline.
Bombs.
Torpedoes.
Aircraft.
All of those things become hazards once flames enter spaces where they should never be.
Kaga had survived every torpedo attack of the morning.
Within minutes of the dive-bomber attack, its future was effectively decided.
Akagi Was Also Struck
Akagi served as Nagumo's flagship.
It did not receive the same number of direct hits as Kaga, but one well-placed bomb could be catastrophic aboard a carrier under operational conditions.
Fire spread.
Aircraft operations became impossible.
Damage-control efforts could not save the ship.
Nagumo eventually had to transfer command.
The carrier that had helped launch the Pearl Harbor attack was now doomed near Midway.
Soryu Was Hit Almost Simultaneously by Yorktown's Dive Bombers
The timing is what transformed a successful attack into a catastrophe for Japan.
Three carriers were struck within minutes.
Not sequentially over hours.
Not one damaged while the others escaped.
Three.
Kaga burning.