Akagi burning.
Sōryū burning.
The core of the Japanese carrier striking force had been shattered before the defenders could understand the full scale of what was happening.
From the water, George Gay witnessed parts of the disaster.
The sole survivor of Torpedo Squadron Eight had attacked a Japanese carrier and watched his squadron disappear.
Now, while still hiding in the ocean, he saw smoke and flames rising from the fleet.
He could not know exactly which American aircraft had delivered the blows.
He could see that something had changed.
The Japanese carriers were burning.
But One Carrier Was Still Operational
Hiryū had escaped the first devastating dive-bomber attack.
That mattered.
Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi and the surviving Japanese air group immediately demonstrated that the battle was not over.
Aircraft from Hiryū located USS Yorktown.
Japanese dive bombers attacked.
Yorktown was damaged.
American damage-control crews performed extraordinary work and restored enough capability that later Japanese attackers initially believed they had found a different undamaged carrier.
Then Japanese torpedo bombers attacked.
Yorktown was hit again.
The carrier eventually had to be abandoned temporarily.
Even after losing three carriers, Japan still possessed enough offensive power to threaten the American fleet severely.
Midway had not been won in the ten famous minutes alone.
Another Japanese carrier remained.
The Americans had to find it.
Later That Afternoon, American Dive Bombers Found Hiryu
Aircraft from Enterprise, including surviving planes from different carrier groups, attacked.
Bombs hit Hiryū.
Fires spread.
The fourth Japanese carrier was doomed.
All four carriers that had formed Nagumo's striking force were lost.
Japan had begun the battle expecting to destroy the American carrier fleet.
Instead, four of its frontline carriers were gone.
The United States would eventually lose Yorktown, which was later torpedoed by the Japanese submarine I-168 while salvage efforts were underway.
The destroyer USS Hammann was also sunk.
The American victory was costly.
The Japanese loss was strategically far worse.
Four Carriers Were Not Just Four Ships
They represented aircraft.
Pilots.
Deck crews.
Mechanics.
Armorers.
Command teams.
Experience built over years.
Japan could build new carriers eventually.
Replacing trained naval aviators and experienced carrier organizations was far more difficult.
Midway did not end Japanese naval aviation overnight.
Japan remained dangerous.
Its fleet would continue fighting.
But the loss of Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū removed a massive portion of the striking force that had dominated the opening months of the Pacific War.
The strategic initiative began shifting.
That is why Midway became such an important battle.
And that is why the deaths of Torpedo Squadron Eight became attached to something much larger than their failed attack.
But Did Torpedo Squadron Eight “Make” the Dive-Bomber Victory Possible?
This question deserves an honest answer.
Yes, in part.
No, not alone.
The torpedo attacks forced Japanese carriers to maneuver.
They forced combat air patrol fighters to respond repeatedly at low altitude.
They created tactical pressure.
They consumed attention.
VT-8, VT-6, and VT-3 all contributed to the defensive chaos surrounding the Japanese force.
Without them, the Japanese combat air patrol might have been positioned differently when the dive bombers appeared.
But the dive-bomber success also depended on many other factors.
American codebreaking had placed the carriers near Midway before the battle began.
McClusky continued searching when turning home would have been understandable.
The destroyer Arashi unintentionally pointed him toward the Japanese fleet.
Maxwell Leslie's group arrived from another direction.
Japanese fighter direction was limited.
The combat air patrol was managing repeated threats without the kind of radar-controlled system that later became more effective.
The dive bombers arrived at a moment of extraordinary opportunity.
No single cause created that moment.
This is important because romanticizing VT-8 as a deliberate sacrifice actually diminishes what the men were trying to do.
They were not human bait.
They were torpedo bomber crews ordered to attack.
They wanted to hit the carriers themselves.
They died trying.
Their Failure Was Real
No VT-8 torpedo sank a carrier.
No torpedo from their fifteen Devastators delivered the decisive blow.
The squadron was destroyed.
It is possible to honor them without pretending otherwise.
In fact, the story becomes more powerful when their tactical failure is admitted.
Military history often searches for ways to make every sacrifice produce an immediate benefit.
That desire is understandable.
It is also dangerous.
Sometimes brave men die and their weapon fails.
Sometimes courage cannot overcome bad equipment.
Sometimes a mission goes wrong because coordination collapses.
Sometimes survival depends on technology that has not yet been developed.
The men of Torpedo Squadron Eight deserve respect because they continued into conditions they understood were terrible.
They do not need a fictional guarantee that their deaths mechanically caused victory.
The Mark 13 Torpedo Did Not Care How Brave the Pilot Was
This is one of the cruel lessons of Midway.
Courage cannot repair a defective weapon in flight.
A pilot can calculate perfectly.
Fly through fighters.
Reach release range.
Put the torpedo into the water correctly.
Then watch engineering failure erase the achievement.
Military organizations sometimes romanticize bravery because bravery is emotionally easier to discuss than procurement failure.
The early-war American torpedo problem was technical and institutional.
The Navy eventually improved the Mark 13 dramatically.
Later versions could be dropped under more flexible conditions and became effective weapons.
But the improvements came after Midway.
Waldron's men did not receive the improved torpedo retroactively.
They flew with the system available in June 1942.
History should remember that when judging what happened.
The TBD Devastator Also Disappeared From Front-Line Carrier Combat Soon After
Midway effectively marked the end of the TBD's frontline career.
The newer TBF Avenger replaced it.
The contrast between the two aircraft revealed how quickly aviation technology was evolving.
The Avenger was larger.
More powerful.
Better armed.
More capable.
Yet even the Avenger was not invulnerable.
The six VT-8 Avengers that attacked from Midway had already demonstrated that.
Five had been lost.
Technology improves odds.
It does not erase tactical reality.
A torpedo bomber attacking without fighter support remains vulnerable.
The larger lesson was therefore not simply "replace the TBD."
Better aircraft.
Better torpedoes.
Better fighter escort.
Better coordination.
All were necessary.
The Torpedo Squadrons Had Been Asked to Solve Too Many Problems at Once
Find the fleet.
Approach low.
Survive fighter interception.
Survive anti-aircraft fire.
Estimate the carrier's movement.