In the early hours of June 4, 1942, Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance stood aboard USS Enterprise facing the kind of decision naval officers usually spend an entire career preparing to make.
The difference was that Spruance had not expected to be making it.
Only days earlier, the American carrier force that would fight near Midway was supposed to be led by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, one of the U.S. Navy's most experienced and aggressive carrier commanders.
Then Halsey became seriously ill with a painful skin condition and was ordered ashore.
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz needed someone to replace him immediately.
Halsey recommended Spruance.
The choice surprised people.
Spruance was a cruiser officer.
He had never commanded a carrier task force in battle.
He was not an aviator.
He had no reputation for theatrical aggression.
He did not pound tables.
He did not give dramatic speeches about carrying the war to the enemy.
He was quiet enough that some officers found him difficult to read.
His face rarely revealed much.
He listened.
He asked questions.
Then he made decisions.
That temperament would matter enormously at Midway.
The Japanese carrier striking force approaching the atoll included four of the most experienced fleet carriers in the world.
Akagi.
Kaga.
Sōryū.
Hiryū.
All four had participated in the offensive that opened the Pacific War.
Their pilots had combat experience.
Their carrier crews were highly trained.
Their commander, Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, had led the carrier force that struck Pearl Harbor.
The Americans would meet them with three carriers.
USS Enterprise.
USS Hornet.
And USS Yorktown, hastily repaired after being damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Spruance commanded Enterprise and Hornet as Task Force Sixteen.
Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, aboard Yorktown, was the senior tactical commander of the combined American carrier force at the beginning of the battle.
That distinction matters.
Spruance did not single-handedly command every American carrier from the opening moment.
He did not win Midway alone.
But he would make several decisions that helped determine whether the American ambush succeeded or failed.
The first of those decisions would come before most of his pilots had even seen the enemy.
American scouts had located Japanese carriers southwest of Midway.
Spruance now faced a choice.
He could move closer before launching.
That would shorten the distance his aircraft needed to fly.
It would save fuel.
It would make it easier for damaged aircraft to return.
It would also consume time.
The Japanese carriers were already conducting operations against Midway.
Their aircraft would soon be returning, refueling, rearming, and preparing for more missions.
If Spruance waited too long, the Japanese might locate the American carriers first.
Then the hunters could become the hunted.
Spruance studied the situation.
He knew how limited the fuel margins were.
He understood that launching from too far away could leave aircraft unable to return.
He also understood something more important.
A carrier battle is not won simply by putting the largest number of aircraft into the sky.
It is won by putting aircraft over the enemy at the moment when the enemy is least able to protect himself.
Spruance decided not to wait for the comfortable range.
He ordered the attack launched early.
American aircraft began lifting from Enterprise and Hornet while the Japanese carriers were still well over a hundred miles away.
It was risky.
The strike immediately began developing problems.
Aircraft became separated.
Fighter escorts did not remain where everyone needed them.
Some groups flew in the wrong direction.
Torpedo bombers attacked nearly alone and were slaughtered.
Fuel became dangerously low.
For a time, Spruance's decision appeared capable of creating disaster.
Then, shortly after ten in the morning, American dive bombers arrived above the Japanese carriers.
Within minutes, Akagi, Kaga, and Sōryū were burning.
The most important thing Raymond Spruance had done was not pull a trigger.
He had chosen when other men would.
Yet the battle was not finished.
One Japanese carrier remained.
American carriers were still vulnerable.
Yorktown would soon be hit.
And before nightfall, Spruance would face another decision almost opposite from the first.
In the morning, he had been willing to attack before conditions were comfortable.
That evening, with victory apparently within reach, he would refuse to charge recklessly westward into darkness after the retreating Japanese fleet.
Many commanders can be aggressive.
Many can be cautious.
Spruance's unusual strength was knowing when to be each.
That balance would become the defining quality of his command.
Before Midway, Raymond Spruance Was Not Famous as a Carrier Admiral
Spruance had spent most of his naval career in the world of surface ships.
Destroyers.
Battleships.
Cruisers.
Staff assignments.
Professional military education.
He was respected for intelligence and methodical thinking rather than for personal flamboyance.
People who served around him frequently described a commander who absorbed information without displaying much emotion.
He did not need to dominate every conversation.
He could listen to specialists whose technical knowledge exceeded his own.
That would be especially important because carrier warfare was changing naval combat so rapidly that even highly experienced officers were still learning what the new battles meant.
The traditional image of naval warfare centered on battleships.
Two fleets find one another.
Heavy guns open fire.
Armored ships trade shells.
Admirals watch from flag bridges.