Fletcher Gave Spruance Permission to Move First
Because Yorktown had scout aircraft out that needed to be recovered, Fletcher could not immediately launch his full strike.
He ordered Spruance to proceed toward the Japanese carriers and attack as soon as practicable.
Fletcher would follow.
The decision placed enormous responsibility on Spruance.
He now possessed two carriers capable of launching a large strike.
The enemy position was known approximately.
The question was when.
The safest aviation answer would have been to close the range.
Every mile closer reduced the fuel problem.
Every mile closer gave pilots more time over the target.
Every mile closer improved the chance damaged planes could return.
But every minute spent closing also allowed Japanese carrier operations to continue.
Spruance had to think not only about where the enemy was.
He had to think about what the enemy would probably be doing when his aircraft arrived.
That is where his decision became remarkable.
Spruance Tried to Attack the Japanese Schedule, Not Merely the Japanese Position
The first Japanese strike against Midway would eventually need to return to its carriers.
Returning aircraft would have to land.
They would need fuel.
Weapons might need to be changed.
Other aircraft would be moved around.
Carrier flight decks operate through cycles.
Launch.
Recover.
Service.
Launch again.
A carrier can conduct those cycles quickly, but it cannot eliminate physical limits.
Spruance and his staff reasoned that if the American strike arrived at the right time, it might catch the Japanese carriers during a vulnerable phase.
This meant launching sooner.
From farther away.
The decision shifted risk from the task force toward the aircrews.
That reality should not be softened.
Pilots would have less fuel margin.
Some might not make it home.
The benefit was time.
Spruance chose time.
Around seven in the morning, Enterprise and Hornet began launching.
The Japanese carriers were still roughly a hundred and fifty miles away, depending on the changing positions and estimates involved.
For carrier aircraft of 1942, that was a serious distance.
Spruance accepted it.
He wanted bombs over the Japanese carriers before the enemy could regain complete control of the morning.
The Launch Immediately Demonstrated How Messy Carrier Warfare Could Become
Aircraft did not simply rise from both carriers as one perfectly organized arrow.
Launching a major strike took time.
Planes had to be spotted on deck.
Engines started.
Aircraft took off in sequence.
Some circled while waiting for others.
Every minute of circling consumed fuel before the formation had even started toward the target.
Different aircraft had different cruising speeds.
Fighters.
Dive bombers.
Torpedo bombers.
Keeping them together required compromise.
Enterprise and Hornet did not produce one seamless combined formation.
Instead, groups began separating.
Problems multiplied.
Spruance had made the decision that sent them forward.
He could not now control every cockpit.
That is the strange nature of carrier command.
An admiral chooses the moment.
Then hundreds of men beyond his sight determine whether the moment becomes victory or failure.
Hornet's Strike Flew Into One of the Battle's Most Controversial Episodes
The main Hornet strike under air group commander Stanhope Ring flew a course that did not bring most of the group to the Japanese carriers.
The episode later became known as the "flight to nowhere."
Fuel disappeared.
Pilots searched.
Aircraft eventually had to turn back.
Some fighters ran out of fuel and ditched.
The details of decisions and responsibility remained controversial.
One Hornet squadron refused to follow the mistake all the way.
Torpedo Squadron Eight, commanded by Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, separated from the larger formation.
Waldron believed he knew where the Japanese carriers were.
He was correct.
His fifteen TBD Devastators found them.
They also found Japanese Zero fighters waiting.
No effective American fighter escort was above them.
Waldron attacked anyway.
All fifteen TBDs were shot down.
Twenty-nine of the thirty men aboard them were killed.
Ensign George Gay survived.
The torpedo attack scored no confirmed hit.
From Spruance's distant flag bridge, the details would not be immediately clear.
He had launched a powerful attack.
Part of it had gone in the wrong direction.
Another part had been destroyed.
At that moment, the battle could still become an American disaster.
Enterprise's Torpedo Bombers Suffered Their Own Catastrophe
Torpedo Squadron Six from Enterprise reached the Japanese fleet.
Its TBDs also faced devastating Japanese fighter opposition.
Most were lost.
Again, no decisive torpedo hit resulted.
Later, Yorktown's Torpedo Squadron Three attacked and suffered terrible losses too.
Japanese Zeros demonstrated exactly why the American torpedo bombers were vulnerable.