Spruance orders full speed west.
Cruisers and destroyers follow.
The American force closes toward retreating Japanese ships.
Newspapers later describe relentless pursuit.
The admiral appears aggressive.
Then darkness falls.
Japanese cruisers and battleships approach.
Long Lance torpedoes move through black water.
American carriers, unable to conduct normal daytime air operations, become enormous targets.
One torpedo reaches Enterprise.
Another hits Hornet.
Suddenly the United States loses the carriers whose survival had just transformed Midway into victory.
This scenario was not guaranteed.
It was possible.
Spruance's responsibility was to think about possibility rather than appearance.
Commanders who survive history are often criticized for dangers that did not happen because their own decisions prevented them.
That can make restraint difficult to appreciate.
Nothing dramatic occurs.
The ships remain afloat.
People conclude perhaps there was never much danger.
Spruance did not need later observers to understand.
He needed carriers tomorrow morning.
The Japanese Had Reasons to Hope the Americans Would Pursue Recklessly
Yamamoto had not immediately accepted defeat.
Orders moved through the Japanese fleet.
Surface forces maneuvered.
Plans changed.
At various moments, Japanese commanders considered shelling Midway or engaging American ships.
The situation became confused as reports of carrier losses accumulated.
A night encounter could have favored Japan's powerful surface forces.
Japanese naval training before the war had emphasized night torpedo attacks extensively.
Cruiser and destroyer crews possessed the formidable Type Ninety-Three oxygen-fueled torpedo, later famous to Americans as the Long Lance.
These weapons had long range and heavy warheads.
American commanders did not fully understand all their technical advantages yet.
They did understand that Japanese night-fighting ability was dangerous.
Spruance saw no reason to offer his carriers as targets simply because momentum encouraged pursuit.
He had already broken the carrier strike force.
There would be daylight again.
Waiting for Daylight Restored the Aircraft Advantage
This was the logic beneath the withdrawal.
Spruance's strength was carrier air power.
Why fight under conditions that neutralized it?
At night, his carrier aircraft provided far less offensive capability.
After sunrise, scouts could search again.
Dive bombers could attack retreating ships from distance.
Fighters could protect the carriers.
The Americans could choose engagements using their greatest strength rather than accept a Japanese surface fight.
This sounds obvious when written in a calm room.
In victory, emotions change calculations.
Commanders want to finish.
Crews want revenge.
Reports of fleeing enemies create urgency.
Spruance resisted that psychological pressure.
He was willing to look cautious for a night because he believed daylight offered better odds.
Again, his lack of theatrical personality helped.
A commander obsessed with appearing bold might have behaved differently.
Spruance seemed more interested in being correct than in being admired.
The Morning After the Carrier Battle, the Japanese Were Retreating
The destruction of the four carriers had broken the heart of the Midway operation.
Yamamoto canceled the invasion.
Japanese forces withdrew.
The American carriers moved again to pursue under daylight conditions.
Search aircraft looked for targets.
Over the next two days, American aircraft struck retreating Japanese ships.
A collision between Japanese cruisers Mogami and Mikuma, caused during emergency maneuvering after contact with an American submarine, created further opportunities.
American carrier aircraft later attacked.
Mikuma was sunk.
Mogami was heavily damaged.
These follow-up attacks mattered.
But they were not worth risking Enterprise and Hornet in a night surface battle.
Spruance had preserved his principal weapons.
Then used them again when conditions favored him.
The pattern repeated.
Wait when waiting improves the odds.
Strike when striking creates advantage.
Midway Was Not a Story of One Perfect American Plan
This point is essential.
The United States won.
It did not execute flawlessly.
Hornet's air group became separated and much of it failed to find the enemy.
Torpedo squadrons were destroyed.
Fighter escort coordination was poor.
Some pilots ran out of fuel.
Aircraft landed wherever they could.
Search information was incomplete.
Radio communications created confusion.
Individual commanders made conflicting decisions.
Several American bombs missed.
Yorktown was hit and eventually lost.
The victory emerged from a mixture of excellent intelligence, brave aircrews, independent judgment, Japanese mistakes, American mistakes, technological limitations, and extraordinary timing.
Spruance's greatness at Midway does not lie in controlling all of this perfectly.
Nobody could.
It lies partly in recognizing what he could control.
Launch timing.
Fleet movement.