A decisions Spruance made there would follow him through the rest of the Pacific campaign

Chapter 12

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It wins long campaigns.


Midway Also Changed Japanese Strategic Possibilities

Japan lost four frontline carriers.

More importantly, it lost significant numbers of experienced carrier aviators and disrupted the organizations supporting them.

The Japanese Navy remained powerful.

But replacing the combination of ships, pilots, deck crews, and experience would be difficult.

The United States, meanwhile, possessed enormous industrial capacity that had barely begun to reach the Pacific in full strength.

New carriers were coming.

New aircraft were coming.

More pilots were being trained.

Midway did not guarantee American victory.

It changed the arithmetic.

Japan had hoped to eliminate the American carriers and extend its defensive perimeter.

Instead, it lost the core striking force that had enabled its early-war offensive.

Spruance had helped turn the ambush around on the force meant to create it.


The Battle's Strategic Importance Made Spruance Famous Within the Navy Faster Than With the Public

He did not possess Halsey's larger-than-life public persona.

That may have limited his popular fame.

Within professional naval circles, Midway made his ability difficult to ignore.

A man with no previous carrier-command experience had taken two carriers into one of history's most consequential naval battles.

He had launched aggressively.

Maintained composure through tactical chaos.

Helped finish the enemy carrier force.

Avoided unnecessary night risk.

Pursued again under favorable conditions.

His decisions looked increasingly strong under detailed examination.

Nimitz trusted him with larger responsibilities later.

That trust would reshape the Central Pacific campaign.


Spruance Would Eventually Command the Fifth Fleet Across the Central Pacific

The later operations dwarfed Midway in scale.

Gilbert Islands.

Marshall Islands.

Marianas.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Iwo Jima.

Okinawa.

The fleets under Spruance eventually contained hundreds of ships.

Carrier task forces became vastly more powerful than anything available in June 1942.

Radar improved.

Fighter direction improved.

Aircraft improved.

Logistics expanded.

American industrial strength transformed the Pacific.

Yet the same personality remained visible.

Spruance still preferred carefully defined objectives.

He still resisted unnecessary risk.

He still could be aggressive when operations required it.

He still drew criticism from officers who believed he sometimes failed to pursue retreating Japanese forces aggressively enough.

The debate that began at Midway followed him.

So did the fundamental question.

How much additional destruction is worth risking the force needed for tomorrow?

Spruance tended to answer conservatively once the strategic objective had been achieved.

Sometimes historians agreed.

Sometimes they argued.

What remained consistent was the method.


The Philippine Sea Later Produced Another Version of the Same Criticism

In June 1944, during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Spruance commanded the Fifth Fleet during the invasion of the Marianas.

Japanese carrier forces approached.

Some American commanders wanted him to move aggressively westward to seek a decisive carrier engagement.

Spruance remained focused on protecting the invasion force.

The resulting battle devastated Japanese naval aviation in what American pilots called the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot."

Yet critics later argued that a more aggressive movement might have destroyed more Japanese carriers.

The pattern resembled Midway.

Spruance prioritized the strategic mission rather than the emotionally satisfying pursuit.

At Midway, the mission was protecting the American carriers and Midway while destroying the Japanese carrier threat.

In the Marianas, the mission centered on protecting the amphibious operation.

Spruance's consistency was almost mathematical.

He did not chase destruction for its own sake.

He destroyed what threatened the objective.

Then he preserved his force.


This Style Made Him Less Romantic Than Admirals Who Chased the Enemy

Naval history loves pursuit.

Signal flags.

Full speed.

Enemy fleeing.

Guns opening.

Victory completed through aggression.

Spruance understood the emotional appeal.

He was willing to leave some destruction unfinished if pursuing it threatened the strategic objective.

This can look unsatisfying.

It may also be one reason his forces repeatedly remained available for the next operation.

Military success is not always maximizing today's enemy losses.

Sometimes it is maximizing your own ability to fight tomorrow.

Spruance understood the difference instinctively.


At Midway, That Difference Was Especially Important Because America Was Still Weak

By 1944, the United States could absorb carrier damage more easily because new ships were arriving in large numbers.

In June 1942, the margin was narrow.

Lose three carriers and American offensive options could collapse temporarily.

Nimitz's calculated-risk principle reflected this scarcity.

The Americans needed to hurt Japan without destroying themselves.

Spruance's decisions matched exactly that requirement.

Launch when a decisive opportunity exists.

Withdraw from unnecessary danger.

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A decisions Spruance made there would follow him through the rest of the Pacific campaign

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