Repairs made.
The ship regained enough capability that when another Japanese strike arrived later, enemy pilots initially believed they were attacking a different American carrier.
Then torpedo bombers hit Yorktown.
The damage became much more serious.
The carrier lost power and developed a heavy list.
Fletcher eventually had to leave the ship and transfer his flag.
With Yorktown disabled, Spruance's role expanded.
The quiet cruiser admiral who had been handed two carriers days earlier now became the principal American carrier commander still operating with undamaged flight decks.
The battle had promoted him through circumstances faster than any ceremony could.
He now had to finish it.
The Fourth Japanese Carrier Became the Most Dangerous Ship in the Pacific
Hiryū had proved it could strike back.
If it remained operational, it could attack Enterprise or Hornet next.
American commanders did not know exactly how many Japanese carriers might still exist elsewhere.
Reports were incomplete.
The sea was enormous.
Identifying Hiryū became urgent.
American scout aircraft searched.
Eventually the carrier was located.
Spruance had aircraft available, though the morning's operations had scattered and depleted his groups.
Pilots had been flying for hours.
Aircraft needed fuel and weapons.
Some squadrons had suffered devastating casualties.
The simplest emotional response after losing contact with Japanese carriers might have been to hesitate.
Spruance did not.
The remaining carrier had demonstrated its danger.
It needed to be hit before it could launch again.
American aircraft went out in the afternoon.
Dive bombers from Enterprise, including surviving aircraft from both carrier groups, reached Hiryū.
They attacked.
Bombs struck the flight deck.
Fires spread.
The fourth Japanese carrier was mortally damaged.
All four of Nagumo's carriers were now doomed.
The immediate Japanese carrier threat had been destroyed.
This is the point where an aggressive commander might feel the battle had become a pursuit.
Spruance did something more complicated.
He began thinking about what could still kill him.
Victory Creates Its Own Kind of Danger
Before success, commanders worry about failure.
After success, they must worry about overconfidence.
Three Japanese carriers were burning.
Then the fourth.
The American instinct naturally turned west.
Pursue.
Destroy more ships.
Finish the fleet.
Spruance understood the temptation.
He also understood the map.
The Japanese carrier force was only one component of a much larger fleet.
Yamamoto had powerful battleships, cruisers, and destroyers in the broader operation.
Japanese surface forces were highly trained for night combat.
American carriers were not battleships.
They were floating airfields protected by cruisers and destroyers.
Their main weapon was aircraft.
At night, aircraft were drastically less useful for offensive carrier operations in 1942.
Japanese surface ships with torpedoes and heavy guns could become terrifying if they closed the distance.
Spruance's air groups were exhausted.
Fuel states were uncertain.
Aircraft were scattered.
Many pilots had been recovered late.
The Americans did not possess complete information about where every Japanese formation was located.
Charging west into darkness could turn a great daytime victory into a nighttime catastrophe.
Spruance had to decide whether aggression still served the battle.
He decided it did not.
Spruance Turned East During the Night
The decision has been debated ever since.
Critics have argued that a more aggressive pursuit might have inflicted even greater losses on the Japanese fleet.
Perhaps additional ships could have been sunk.
Perhaps the retreat could have become a rout.
Those possibilities cannot be dismissed entirely.
But Spruance did not know the future.
He knew the situation available to him that evening.
Japanese surface forces remained dangerous.
The Americans had already achieved the central objective.
The enemy carriers threatening Midway had been destroyed.
The American carriers still afloat were strategically priceless.
Night combat favored Japanese doctrine and weaponry.
His pilots needed recovery time.
His task was not to prove courage.
His task was to preserve the victory.
So he temporarily moved eastward, away from the direction from which Japanese surface forces were most likely to approach.
This action has often been presented as the opposite of his morning decision.
In the morning, Spruance had launched early from uncomfortable range.
At night, he refused an aggressive chase.
The two decisions were actually based on the same principle.
Calculated risk.
In the morning, the possible reward justified the danger.
At night, the possible reward no longer justified risking the carriers.
Same commander.
Same logic.
Different answer.
That is what judgment looks like.
A Reckless Admiral Could Have Looked More Heroic for Several Hours
Imagine the alternative.