A decisions Spruance made there would follow him through the rest of the Pacific campaign

Chapter 5

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The TBD was slow.

Its attack required low altitude and a relatively steady approach.

The American Mark Thirteen aerial torpedo was unreliable.

Pilots had to expose themselves to fighters and anti-aircraft fire simply to give a questionable weapon a chance.

American courage could not repair those technical limitations in the air.

From a tactical perspective, the torpedo attacks were failures.

The Japanese carriers remained intact.

American squadrons were being destroyed.

Spruance had accepted long-range risk to strike early.

For more than an hour, the visible result seemed horrifying.

This is important.

His decision looks brilliant because we know what happened at ten twenty.

He did not know at eight thirty.

A commander makes decisions before history provides the answer.


Wade McClusky Was Running Out of Ocean and Fuel

Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky led Enterprise dive bombers toward the expected enemy position.

When they arrived, the Japanese carriers were not there.

The ocean looked empty.

This was one of the most dangerous moments of the morning.

The dive bombers had already consumed fuel reaching the area.

Every minute spent searching reduced the fuel available for returning to Enterprise.

Turning back would preserve aircraft.

Continuing could leave pilots unable to reach any carrier.

McClusky continued searching.

Then he saw a Japanese destroyer below.

The ship was moving fast.

The destroyer was Arashi.

It had been delayed after attacking the American submarine USS Nautilus.

Now it was rushing back toward the Japanese carrier force.

McClusky made an inference.

A destroyer moving at high speed toward the northeast was probably returning to something important.

He followed the direction.

Ahead, the empty Pacific suddenly became filled with ships.

The Japanese carriers had been found.

This single piece of individual judgment became one of the reasons Spruance's early launch worked.

Had McClusky turned back, the admiral's decision might have produced only missing aircraft and dead torpedo crews.

Command decisions still depend on subordinate initiative.

Spruance had created the opportunity.

McClusky refused to let it disappear.


Yorktown's Dive Bombers Were Approaching at Nearly the Same Time

Lieutenant Commander Maxwell Leslie led Yorktown's dive bombers toward the Japanese carrier force.

They had their own navigation and coordination problems.

Some aircraft had lost bombs accidentally before reaching the target.

Yet the group continued.

Through circumstances no single American commander had perfectly orchestrated, Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers approached the Japanese fleet at nearly the same time.

Below them, Japanese fighters had spent much of the morning reacting to low-altitude attacks.

Midway-based aircraft had attacked.

Torpedo Squadron Eight had attacked.

Torpedo Squadron Six had attacked.

Torpedo Squadron Three had attacked.

Japanese carriers had maneuvered repeatedly.

Combat air patrol aircraft had descended to intercept threats.

The defensive system was still functioning.

It was not positioned perfectly for what now appeared overhead.

American dive bombers began their attacks.

The entire battle changed in minutes.


Three Japanese Carriers Were Suddenly Burning

Kaga took multiple hits.

Fires spread rapidly.

Aircraft, aviation fuel, bombs, and torpedoes turned internal spaces into hazards.

Damage-control teams fought desperately.

The carrier's ability to conduct flight operations collapsed.

Akagi was also hit.

One well-placed bomb and the resulting fires proved devastating.

Nagumo's flagship became unusable.

Sōryū was struck by Yorktown's dive bombers.

It too erupted into uncontrollable fires.

Within a remarkably short span, three of Japan's four fleet carriers were effectively doomed.

The same Japanese force that had appeared dominant only minutes earlier now faced catastrophe.

From an American perspective, the event seemed almost impossible.

For hours, attacks had failed.

Torpedo bombers had died.

The enemy had seemed untouchable.

Then the geometry changed.

Dive bombers arrived from above.

Bombs hit.

The carrier striking force began destroying itself through the secondary effects of fire, fuel, ordnance, and aircraft.

Spruance did not see the bomb impacts personally from a nearby ship.

He received reports.

This is another reality of carrier command.

A decision made on a flag bridge becomes explosions beyond the horizon.

Success arrives as messages.


Spruance Could Not Assume the Battle Was Won

Three carriers burning sounds decisive.

In many battles, it would be.

Midway still contained one critical fact.

Hiryū remained operational.

Its commander, Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, moved quickly.

Japanese aircraft were launched against the American carriers.

The first Japanese counterstrike found Yorktown.

Dive bombers attacked.

Bombs hit.

The carrier was damaged.

American damage-control crews responded with exceptional speed.

Fires were fought.

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A decisions Spruance made there would follow him through the rest of the Pacific campaign

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