Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto wanted a decisive naval battle.
After Pearl Harbor and several months of Japanese victories, the United States remained dangerous primarily because its carrier force survived.
The American carriers had not been at Pearl Harbor during the attack.
They had already demonstrated their value through raids and at the Coral Sea.
Yamamoto wanted them destroyed.
Midway provided the bait.
The Japanese would attack and seize the atoll.
If American carriers came to defend it, the Combined Fleet would destroy them.
But the Japanese operation was spread across enormous distances.
There were invasion forces.
Support forces.
Submarine lines.
An operation in the Aleutians.
Nagumo's four carriers formed the striking force most directly responsible for attacking Midway.
Yamamoto's main force remained far behind.
The plan contained considerable power.
It also contained separation.
Japanese forces that might have been devastating if concentrated were distributed across the Pacific.
Worse for Japan, the plan depended heavily on surprise.
American codebreaking had already damaged that assumption.
Spruance did not need to defeat the entire Imperial Japanese Navy.
He needed to help destroy the carrier striking force before Japan understood the trap.
That difference made the impossible more manageable.
Yorktown Was Supposed to Be Too Damaged to Participate
A month before Midway, Yorktown had been hit at the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Japanese planners had reason to believe the carrier would not be available immediately.
At Pearl Harbor, American repair crews examined the damage.
A normal repair schedule could have taken far longer than the time available.
Nimitz did not have normal time.
So the repair effort was compressed brutally.
Men worked continuously.
Temporary fixes replaced perfect fixes.
The objective was not to return Yorktown to pristine condition.
The objective was to make it fight.
The carrier sailed.
Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher commanded Task Force Seventeen from Yorktown.
Because Fletcher was senior to Spruance, he held overall tactical command of the American carrier force at the beginning of the battle.
This fact is sometimes lost in popular stories that elevate Spruance into the sole American commander at Midway.
The reality was more interesting.
Fletcher and Spruance had separate task forces.
They coordinated.
Fletcher had the senior role.
Spruance commanded two carriers and would receive considerable freedom to attack.
Later, after Yorktown was disabled, Spruance would effectively assume broader command.
The victory was shared across commanders, staffs, pilots, intelligence officers, sailors, mechanics, and luck.
Spruance's importance does not require erasing anyone else.
The American Carriers Waited Northeast of Midway
Waiting can be harder than attacking.
Every hour gave the Japanese another chance to discover the American force.
Every radio transmission carried risk.
Every scout report mattered.
The carriers operated in a huge empty space where the enemy might be less than two hundred miles away and still invisible.
Deck crews prepared aircraft.
Pilots studied charts.
Bombs and torpedoes were readied.
Fuel lines crossed flight decks.
Fighters stood ready for combat air patrol.
Spruance had time to think.
That may have been more dangerous than action.
A commander who knows a major battle is approaching can imagine every possible failure.
Japanese aircraft could appear suddenly.
The intelligence might be wrong.
The carriers might be too far north.
The enemy might approach from a different bearing.
The American attack could launch and find nothing.
If aircraft returned low on fuel while enemy bombers arrived, crowded flight decks could become death traps.
Every possibility argued for caution.
The existence of the Japanese carriers argued for action.
Spruance waited because there was not yet a target.
He would stop waiting the moment there was.
Before Dawn on June 4, the Japanese Launched Against Midway
Nagumo's carriers began sending aircraft toward the atoll.
Japanese bombers and fighters crossed the morning sky in a powerful formation.
Midway's radar and patrol system detected them.
American aircraft began taking off.
Fighters climbed.
Bombers prepared their own attacks against the Japanese fleet.
The battle started before the American carriers had launched their main strike.
Japanese aircraft hit Midway hard.
But the atoll remained capable of further combat.
A returning Japanese flight leader reported that another strike would be necessary.
That recommendation would complicate Nagumo's morning.
While Japanese aircraft attacked the island, American search planes were looking for the carriers.
Then came the report everyone aboard the American task forces had been waiting for.
Japanese carriers had been sighted.
The exact position would be refined through continuing reports.
For Spruance, uncertainty suddenly became geometry.
Enemy bearing.
Estimated speed.
Distance.
His own carriers' position.
Aircraft range.
Launch time.
Expected arrival.
The abstract battle became a calculation.